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I: Blind Spots: a concept and its typology 
 
When, in King Lear, the old man refuses to leave Gloucester despite his bidding, 
because Gloucester “cannot see [his] way,” the blind Gloucester replies, bitterly 
reflecting on his earlier failure to recognise his sons morally:  
 
I have no way, and therefore want no eyes.   
I stumbled when I saw. Full oft ’tis seen, 
Our means secure us and our mere defects 
Prove our commodities…   (F, 4.1.18–21).1 
 
What do we see when we cannot see, or see defectively? How do our blind spots 
prove our commodities? By extension, what happens when seeing and knowing are 
prised apart? What is the epistemic purchase of unseeing? In the same play, Lear 
questions the familiar sensory hierarchy of Aristotelian epistemology, where “sight 
best helps us to know things,” a privileging also familiar from the Platonic tradition 
where knowing is a kind of seeing.2 Learning the cost of his emotional and ethical 
misrecognitions with each passing moment, he ironically severs the function of seeing 
from that of knowing oneself, and even from being known and knowing the other: 
“Doth any here know me? This is not Lear: / […] Where are his eyes? / […] Who is it 
that can tell me who I am?” (1.4.246–50). As John Berger writes, “it is seeing which 
establishes our place in the surrounding world,” but “the relation between what we 
see and what we know is never settled.”3 He posits seeing as a more complex, more 
active, more mobile activity than a purely optical function, “a question of 
mechanically reacting to stimuli”: “It can only be thought of in this way if one isolates 
the small part of the process which concerns the eye’s retina.”4 
Yet even the internal processes of the retina are more dynamic and less “settled” than 
– literally – meets the eye, which sees more than it sees “through means secure.” The 
assumed relation in social discourse between ocular vision as vehicle and perception 
as tenor is unsettlingly reversible. So the optical metaphor remains functional, and has 
an unexpected synergy with the social, psychological and interpretative acts of seeing 
to which Berger has trained us to be attentive. The “blind spot” is a part of the retina – 
the optic disc or nerve-head – which lacks photoreceptor cells. Hence, no vision is 
detectable at this spot in the visual field. But, by a curious process of readjustment, 
the brain “reads” the blind spot by interpolating it with information from the 
surrounding field, including the other eye: so the blind spot itself is not visible to the 
eye to which it belongs. But because of its invisibility in the “normal” sense, it 
induces an optically inventive way of seeing, activating tools of perception not 
ordinarily in use. It is, thus, analogous at once to a particular point in a larger picture 
that, for different possible reasons, we fail to see; and to a mental act of seeing that 
makes up for what is off-scene by seeing indirectly, inferentially and imaginatively. 
But there is a further twist in the paradoxical reach of the blind spot as metaphor: in a 
digital photo of the retina, it looks dazzling. Thus, it is at once blind in that it cannot 
see, or be visible to vision; and blindingly bright in its dense, nerve-packed opacity 
when imaged.  






It was not till 1660 that the French physicist Edme Marriotte – sensationally – 
discovered and documented the blind spot. Yet the perceptual implications of the 
scotoma in any given monocular field of vision were understood, and in productive 
use, in the cultural imaginary of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries: a 
contrapuntal strand in the dominant ocularcentrism of its texture. Shakespeare, for 
one, seems to have “known” the blind spot of the eye and the mind well before it 
floated within the ken of science. The viewing relations and optical agencies 
implicated by its “blindness” inform and structure his explorations of the forms, 
processes and inter-subjectivity of knowing, our possible engagements with it, and the 
business of representation – making visible and thereby knowable. The love-juice 
with which Puck streaks the lovers’ eyes in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, from which 
the dream of the night arbitrarily ensues, engendering at once “hateful fantasies” and 
unlikely “[enthralments]” (2.1.258; 3.1.116), makes the Platonic optics of love run 
helter skelter – a playful send-up of what George Hakewill (and Stuart Clark, after 
him) call “the vanity of the eye”: the assumptions of the rationalism and primacy of 
sight.5 But the imperfections of the eye had particular applications in drama, not least 
because of the ontology of the early modern theatre which relied on activating modes 
of seeing what could not be shown: routinely asking the audience to see with “parted 
eye”.6 Shakespeare picked up on the theatrical potential of this condition as well as its 
demands, enjoining his viewers to see Dover Cliff while looking at flat ground, or the 
vasty fields of France within the wooden O of the stage. But he also tuned into the 
affective, ethical, perceptual and mimetic scope of blindness, blind-spotting, and 
indeed blind-spot-spotting, pushing the implications of seeing what is not visible, and 
not seeing what is, by deploying his medium. Shakespeare’s works are our focus, but 
not our horizon. This volume, likewise, is an indicative probe rather than an 
exhaustive exploration. We hope that it will thematise an internally complementary 
process, between text and hermeneutics, and make it available for a wider range of 
works in the early modern period.  
 
In common parlance, a blind spot is an obstructed view, or an instance of partial or 
partisan perception, or even a localised lack of understanding: its meaning sliding 
from the physical to the cognitive to the epistemological. Integral to Shakespeare’s 
recreation of human reality, both individual and relational, this function determines 
the first kind of blind spots in his works which repeatedly stage moments of 
unmastered and unmasterable knowledge, whether it is because characters cannot or 
will not “know” it. This can take the form of a perceptual failure or denial within the 
fiction that can exact a devastating cost, as when Emilia in Shakespeare’s Othello – 
and perhaps Gertrude in Hamlet, especially the Folio text – resist knowledges about 
their own agency and their husband’s designs that are accessible, but emotionally 
unaffordable.7 Obscured by the psyche, they surface like spectres at key moments of 
re-cognition – as when Emilia mutters, on learning of Iago’s villainy, “I thought so 
then; I’ll kill myself for grief” (Othello 5.2.192). As Berger says, “to look is an act of 
choice”; so is not to look.8 Or think of The Winter’s Tale when Leontes – with 
doomful shades of Oedipus – not only declares the oracle void of truth, but perversely 
refuses to see the corrosive damage his jealous fury is wreaking on his loved ones, 
and interprets Mamillius’s reactive sickness in the light of the only knowledge in his 
sight: “Conceiving the dishonour of his mother! / He straight declin’d, drooped, took 
it deeply, / […]/ And downright languish’d” (The Winter’s Tale 2.3.13–17). Looking 




much [belief]’ in his ‘own suspicion’ (3.2.151) that he forgets the sanity of seeing at 
its simplest, most lucid level as he declares its irrelevance in proving his wife’s 
assumed guilt: 
 
…  Camillo’s flight, 
Added to their familiarity, 
(Which was as gross as ever touch’d conjecture, 
That lack’d sight only, nought for approbation 
But only seeing …     (2.1.174–78) 
 
Cognitive blind spots can show us how precariously close suspicion is to conviction, 
and how hopelessly entangled knowledge is with the force of belief, for better or for 
worse.9   
 
But let us take a more layered example – an instance of a blind spot of knowledge 
which slides from mimetic content to representational concern, operating not only at 
the threshold between the self and the other, but also between the text and the reader. 
Significantly, it is a scene of viewing. As the raped Lucrece laments at length before 
disclosing her plight to her husband in the narrative poem, The Rape of Lucrece, she 
comes to face a tapestry (or panel-painting) depicting the siege of Troy. In a crowded 
canvas, her eyes fasten on one detail, “a face where all distress is stelled” (l. 1444): 
this is “despairing Hecuba” (l. 1447), a passive sufferer with whom she can identify. 
“[Throwing] her eyes about the painting round,” she extends her lament to “who she 
finds forlorn” (1499–1500), all other figures and themes being (as it were) invisible to 
her eyes. But then she pauses on “the perjured Sinon” (l. 1522) – in her mind, the 
cause of Hecuba’s grief, having been the direct instrument of the siege of Troy. 
Indignant that he should have “so fair a form”, “with a mind so ill,” her outrage rises 
to destructive rage as she identifies him with her rapist Tarquin who had a similarly 
deceptive exterior: 
 
Here, all enraged, such passion her assails, 
That patience is quite beaten from her breast; 
She tears the senseless Sinon with her nails, 
Comparing him to that unhappy guest 
Whose deed hath made herself herself detest.   (ll. 1562–66) 
 
In her fit of passion, she fails to see that the painted Sinon is “senseless”, and ends up 
destroying the art-work. Soon enough, she herself registers the hysteria, indeed almost 
ridiculousness, of her naïve response as a quieter maturity dawns:  
 
At last she smilingly with this gives o’er: 
“Fool, fool”, quoth she, “his wounds will not be sore”.  (ll. 1567–68)  
 
In a poem much engaged with the affect and ethics of response, especially to pain, 
Lucrece’s empathy may seem to qualify her to give the voiceless Hecuba’s grief a 
tongue, unlike Marcus’ rhetorical, aestheticising, over-eloquent attempt to speak for 
the raped, tongue-less Lavinia in the other work Shakespeare wrote about rape and 
representation around the same time as the poem: Titus Andronicus. Marcus’s 
dissonant address feels, even if it is not, emotionally detached from its subject, while 




Lucrece’s extreme identification makes her blind to the fundamental difference 
between art and life, if only for an extended moment. So here is a blind spot that 
confronts us, through textual inscription, with our own relation to works of art. Do we 
need to unsee the affective reality and subjecthood of characters within a fiction, to be 
sophisticated consumers of art? What are the limits of empathy in aesthetic response? 
Can identification – infeeling – be the blind spot which, instead of helping, closes the 
critical distance that empathy actively needs, as material for reaching across, as space 
for bridging? Dipping back, for a moment, from reflexive art into inset life, we might 
consider how Titus forgets basic distinctions in his ludicrously disproportionate 
railing against Marcus for killing a fly: ‘How if that fly had a father and mother?’ 
(Titus Andronicus 3.2.60). Pace the blind spot of certain strands of ecocritical 
readings of a seamless continuum between human and animal life in such moments, 
the theatre audience invariably laugh and share Marcus’ incomprehension – “Alas, 
my lord, I have but kill’d a fly” – even while they register the extremity of grief that 
makes Titus over-identify with any infinitely suffering thing (Titus, 3.2.59). The 
tradition of archly witty exercises in the disproportion between a literary genre and its 
small subjects (and tropes) was established enough to provide a playfully parodic 
context to the fly-killing scene - from Lucian’s encomium “In Praise of a Fly”, to 
Spenser’s “Muiopotmos, or the Fate of the Butterflie”, and Donne’s “The Flea”.10 The 
faintly ironic frames or overtones of these moments in Shakespeare refract our vision. 
A character’s encounter with a fly, no less than another’s with the painting of an epic 
war, raises questions about the blind spots of aesthetic encounter. What excesses of its 
own does tragedy tend not to acknowledge, which outsiders to the high tragic culture 
– a Moorish Aaron, say, “[prying] … through the crevice of a wall” at the Roman 
Titus’s hand being swapped for his son’s heads – would laugh at till their “eyes were 
rainy like to his” (Titus, 5.1.114, 117)? In the 1590s, Shakespeare’s ‘crannied [holes]’ 
tend to figure apertures through which one genre refracts into another, making us see 
in a different key. So the comic Bottom ‘as’ the tragic Pyramus pleads to his ‘lovely 
wall’: ‘Show me thy chink, to blink through with mine eyne’ (Dream, 5.1.156; 174). 
 
Another instance of a blind spot presenting itself as an encounter in the text that 
invites a recalibrated encounter with the text is the double report of Brutus’s wife 
Portia’s death in Julius Caesar. Anyone who was taught by the late Tony Nuttall will 
have been faced with this puzzling re-occurrence in the Folio and asked to make sense 
of it. Is it another textual error or corruption? A repetition that someone – maybe 
Shakespeare – forgot to take out during some sort of process of revision? There are 
potential indications in the relevant section – not least in the variety of speech 
headings for Cassi/Cas/Cass, and the unique stage direction of “Boy” to replace 
Messala – of incomplete revision and interpolations at two stages of composition.11 
Here is the anomaly. Cassius and Brutus have uneasily made up after an angry 
altercation, but when Brutus intimates a hinterland of heart-struck sorrow – “O 
Cassius, I am sick of many griefs” – Cassius cannot resist a last jab: “Of your 
philosophy you make no use, / If you give place to accidental evils” (4.1.145–46). 
This prompts Brutus to reply, slightly defensively, “No man bears sorrow better. 
Portia is dead” (4.1.147), and leads him to disclose the terrible manner of her suicide. 
Cassius is suitably mortified, as this is a far stronger justification of Brutus’s 
disturbed state of mind than his own poor excuse of a “rash humour” his mother gave 
him (4.1.120) for his own ill temper. The impact of the revelation seems about to be 
helpfully defused by the entrance of Lucius, and then of Messala and Titinius, 




pray you” (4.1.166). But Messala leads up, through probing questions, to the subject 
of Portia’s death. Trying and failing to throw him off track, Brutus realises he has to 
engage and pretends he has not heard anything: “Now, as you are a Roman, tell me 
true.” Messala comes right back at him on his terms: “Then like a Roman bear the 
truth I tell, / For certain, she is dead, and by strange manner” (4.1.186, 4.1.187–88). 
Brutus “reacts” with what, to Cassius, is at once duplicity and an astonishing display 
of fortitude: 
 
Why, farewell, Portia: we must die, Messala. 
With meditating that she must die once 
I have the patience to endure it now. (4.1.190–92) 
 
Messala observes, with hushed admiration, “Even so great men great losses should 
endure” (4.1.193). Cassius, more knowingly, remarks: 
 
I have as much of this in art as you, 
But yet my nature could not bear it so.    (4.1.194–195) 
 
Are we to assume, because it lacks immediate coherence, that the double 
announcement must be an oversight? Or should we read the duplication as a dramatic 
shape, inducting us into a way of seeing what cannot be owned within the parameters 
of the Rome that these characters inhabit: the parallel processes of a keenly felt 
challenge to Brutus’s Roman identity; the inseparability of this identity from the ethic 
of Stoicism – the “philosophy” Cassius alludes to; the distance between Brutus’s 
private, emotional self and his public, political persona; the high Stoic manner as the 
stuff of performance, and the affective repressions and evasions it demands? If we 
had the second report alone, we might have found Brutus’ response almost inhuman – 
exemplifying the static model of Stoicism as a freedom from emotional disturbance.12 
If we had the first alone, we would only have seen his fragility. Together, they show 
us the dynamic arc from a bleak, all too human bereavement to a formal, willed 
control of emotions. This is also an insight into the half-lit cognitive crevices and 
bypaths of the intense relationship between Brutus and Cassius. Nuttall suggests that 
this textual crux – which has divided editors - invites us to step out of the “customary 
canons of art” by probing the tautness of the moment in terms of the emotional life of 
the characters; to read nature into art.13 This feels right. And such redirection of 
attention is, typically, a function of our encounters with blind spots in art-works.  
 
The implication of re-casting seeing distinguishes a range of Shakespearean blind 
spots, often combining with other properties. The recalibration that is so central to the 
optical functions of the blind spot models a hermeneutic encounter where the 
conventional processing of information is disrupted and diverted. When inscribed in 
the action, this has the potential to be tragic: think of situations where characters 
misread from circumstantial evidence, supplementing what is invisible or obscure by 
bending their gaze, reading inferentially from a semiotic neighbourhood. Typically, 
this variety of oblique reading operates in an evidentiary dramatic structure. When 
Diana in All’s Well that Ends Well enargeically presents a ring to incriminate Bertram 
– “O, behold this ring” – the Countess is convinced that she is his wife and, further, 
that he has murdered his wife: “That ring’s a thousand proofs” (All’s Well 5.3.191, 
199). Yet as the plot unravels, it turns out to prove, rather, the manipulative potency 




the ironic susceptibility of a defendant to a counter-use of over-freighted signs, as 
Bertram stakes his honesty on the same object: 
 
If you shall prove 
This ring was ever hers, you shall as easy 
Prove that I husbanded her bed in Florence…   (5.3.124–26) 
 
In the event, the ring does prove he had meant to sleep with Diana, but not with any 
intention to marry her, and that he had in fact slept with his lawfully wedded wife – 
showing how evidential inference from sensible contiguous signs can be a slippery 
index to both deed and thought.14 Emotional situations dominated by sexual jealousy 
tend to focus such processes with particular imaginative force, for in the grip of 
passionate suspicion, we make the world we see, though we take our cues from the 
visible world around us: Othello “wear[s]” his eyes to watch his wife but images what 
is not through his mind (3.3.198). Cymbeline offers a paradigmatic example in 
Posthumus’s disastrous mis-seeing of Iachimo’s vividly visual evocation of “corporal 
[signs]” of his supposed enjoyment of Imogen’s body, backed up with visible material 
tokens from the alleged scene of “incontinency” (Cymbeline 2.4.119, 127). But the 
foregrounded and dilatory jouissance of Iachimo’s narrative recreation, both when he 
convinces Posthumus and when he recounts the bedroom scene again by way of 
confession, manifests Shakespeare’s acute alertness to the potential non-congruence 
of enargeia with evidence: an equation derived from the Latin rhetorical tradition, and 
more specifically, its translation of enargeia as evidentia.15 Their assumed identity is 
undercut as rhetorical temptation is shown to outstrip legal necessity. So, in the 
Shakespearean theatre, enargeia becomes the blind spot of the judicial imagination, 
with rhetoric at once shaping, and helping us deconstruct, the temptations and errors 
of the mind’s eye.  
 
Yet, in an almost chiastic move, precisely such cognitive diversions can take a 
productive form when the text demands a re-orientation of our position as the 
knowing subject to the object of knowledge. In Troilus and Cressida, faced with a 
Cressida he cannot recognise by his unitary code of human nature – “This is, and is 
not, Cressid” – Troilus muses on “the spacious breadth of this division” which 
“admits no orifex for a point as subtle / As Ariachne’s broken woof to enter” (5.2.146; 
150–52). There is an obvious wobble in the text here, which the Riverside editors call 
“Shakespeare’s error for the name of Arachne, who, according to Ovid … was turned 
into a spider by Pallas.”16 But the designation of “error” may be a blind spot refusing 
to see around this fracture in the text, this visible obscurity, to find the luminousness 
of Shakespeare’s conflation. For if he is half-remembering Arachne’s spider-web in 
talking of Ariadne’s thread, given to Theseus to help him out of the Cretan maze, that 
would be a glimpse of how the tremor of a single image can capture the closeness 
between the sinister labyrinth that traps and the clue that guides.  
 
If Shakespeare’s own errors are acts of mingled memory opening up a corridor of 
knowingness that “correct” rendering – or seeing straight – would have left closed, his 
characters’ mistaking eyes seem, often, to similarly defer the closure of a text. 
Sometimes this can take the opposite form to seeing “double” (Dream, 4.1.190): 
collapsing persons and identities that should be distinct. Even as he correctly sees 
Polixenes’ features in his son, Florizel, who presents Perdita as his wife, Leontes fails 




sensory failure. When Florizel says that his father, Polixenes, would “grant precious 
things as trifles” at his old friend Leontes’s bidding, Leontes immediately replies that 
in that case he would “beg [his] precious mistress / Which he counts but as a trifle.” If 
this is a joke, its uneasiness is sealed by Paulina’s reprimand: “Sir, my liege, / Your 
eye hath too much youth in’t,” reminding Leontes of Hermione’s superior mature 
beauty even at the time of her death. Leontes replies hastily: “I thought of her / Even 
as these looks I made” (The Winter’s Tale 5.1.222–27). This moment was bound to 
call up, in Shakespeare’s theatre, the incestuous passion of the father for the daughter 
in the Shakespeare’s source-text, Greene’s hugely popular prose romance Pandosto 
(1588).17 Indeed, it anticipates that other glimpse of kink through a literary pre-history 
– Ovid’s Pygmalion and his sex-doll – at the moment when Leontes moves to kiss the 
supposed statue of Hermione and Paulina restrains him, saying that the paint is still 
wet. Miscognition in the plot, here, acts as a productive distortion of the intertextual 
lens, generating new interpretative possibilities. The mischief written into such errant 
seeing could be seen to work at the expense of the characters’ sense of self, but as 
aesthetic capital, if played with suitable authenticity on stage. Somewhat similarly to 
Troilus and Cressida, blind spots of knowledge at moments such as these could enact 
the ironic variance between the mimetic reality of the characters’ emotional lives and 
their helplessly pre-scripted status in literary history. Yet, at the same time, blind 
spots have a way of teetering on the verge between almost alienated subjecthood and 
subjective emotional lives. For Leontes’s encounter with the grown-up Perdita is not 
just a hint of incestuous attraction drifting in from the genetic past of the text, but also 
a deep longing for her to be Hermione in the living moment, just as that later moment 
of a near-kiss embodies a heart-rending desire for the return of love. These oddly 
disruptive moments of temporal telescoping are little puncta in “the optical 
unconscious” – to borrow Rosalind Krauss’s term; opening not only into corridors of 
intertextual and psychosexual memory but also into wellsprings of affective fantasies 
that are unutterable except through indirection because they are so extreme in their 
improbability.18 They fray the surface of the text to make us see both beneath, and 
beyond, what can be shown.  
 
Blind spots such as these are also, potentially, a generic threshold. The glimpse of the 
buried knowledge of the father-daughter story in The Winter’s Tale is also the pivot 
on which genres turn: it contains in a single event the translation of Pandosto’s 
suicidally tragic passion into a tragicomedy of restoration, as if allowing desire to 
transit from repression to wish-fulfilment. “What you know, you know,” says Iago, in 
an ultimate defiance of evidential epistemology and propelling an unbearable tragedy 
to its unyielding end in Othello (5.2.303). But the words his line echoes most closely 
are from Dromio of Ephesus, in the early comedy, The Comedy of Errors: “I know 
what I know” (3.1.11). Are cognitive blind spots – faced or fashioned – generically 
Janus-faced? Or do they face us with the contrivance of generic structures by pushing 
the bounds of one genre towards another? To reclaim a responsible relation with its 
living material, for example, comedy forges a language that works against the grain of 
its own conventional underpinnings: witness Hermione’s anguished but sharp 
question to Leontes when he first erupts with jealous fury: “What is this? Sport?” 
(The Winter’s Tale 2.1.58); or Beatrice’s seemingly disproportionate and generically 
out-of-place demand of Benedick, in Much Ado About Nothing, after his friend 
emotionally kills hers: “Kill Claudio” (Much Ado 4.1.289). In the final moments of 
the Folio tragedy of Lear, on the other hand, Lear’s blind spot and ours come together 




arms, Lear glides from recognition – “Thou’lt come no more” (5.3.281) – to possible 
misrecognition, dying on these words: 
 
Do you see this? Look on her, look, her lips, 
Look there, look there.     (5.3.284–85) 
 
The range of ways in which directors, actors, editors and indeed readers want to 
interpret, and have rendered, these lines mirrors the blind spots in our own imagined 
vision of tragic ending, tragic magnitude and tragic knowledge.  
 
The agency of the theatre vis-à-vis textually open and indeterminate moments brings 
us to the blind spot of embodiment. Shakespeare’s “open silences”, to borrow Philip 
Maguire’s phrase, become an operative counterpart to what cannot be shown.19 What 
cannot be heard, no less than the invisible, directs our attention to the ways in which 
performance can forestall closure. On occasions, like the errors in or of the text, these 
mark portals into textual prehistories and reach for information in the ‘backward and 
abysm of time’.20 In North’s Plutarch (1579), Shakespeare’s source-text for 
Coriolanus, Tacita is the Roman Goddess of silence: “[Numa] taught the Romans to 
reverence one of them above all the rest, who was called Tacita, as ye would say Lady 
Silence”.21 As with the affective translation of Ovid and Greene in The Winter’s Tale, 
so here, the narrative source is made to speak its silence on stage. On the triumphant 
return of Coriolanus to Rome in Act II, his greeting to his wife Virgilia turns the spot-
light on her eloquently speechless presence: “My gracious silence, hail!” (2.1.175). 
Prefiguration helps cast silence as an island of sacrosanct intimacy and tenderness in a 
clamorous scene; it also makes Virgilia’s inwardness shimmer – intimating its reality 
but not giving away its substance. The blind spot of the play-text, in examples such as 
this, intimates a model of memory and marks a type of literary interrelation between 
past and present.  
 
The other kind of non-verbal gap – the one explored by Maguire – consists of features 
that determine the meanings of speechless moments by drawing on the emotional 
environment around them. The mutilated Lavinia in Titus, speechless from Act 2 
scene 4 onwards, in a different context, is the most vivid presence on stage; the 
theatre has to decide how to mediate, or make known, her inner state through action. 
But if this is a moment that can draw both horizontally and vertically (so to speak) 
from the affective neighbourhood in the play as well as from its Ovidian past, the 
silent Isabella facing the Duke’s uneasy speech at the end of Measure for Measure 
presents a gap in the fabric of the action, which can only take shape in performance, 
out of the extra-textual resources of the play itself: I have seen as many interpretations 
as there are Isabellas on stage. The play-text, here, acts as the retinal nerve-sheet, 
where moments of silence are openings for actors and director to fill in, just as the eye 
– helped by the brain – fills in the cavity where the optic nerve enters with 
information from the adjoining field. These blind spots, then, create an interface at 
which choices need to be made. Barthes talks of the distance between crude 
knowledge and subtle life as one that is “corrected” by literature, just as the brain 
corrects the visual void of the blind spot.22 Yet, the model is less stable than 
“correction” when it comes to performance. Such choices in the theatre need to 
negotiate the mobile boundary between knowledge as lived experience within the 




how much – the text would have the reader or viewer know. These imbrications create 
an ecology of knowledges that is never entirely predictable or fixable.  
 
Irreducibility takes several forms. The Other is a foreign country, as so many plays 
show: witness Othello or The Winter’s Tale, or, in a more metaphysical key, Troilus. 
But sometimes, so is the self. The inevitable partiality of self-knowledge is a trigger 
for the undoing of Lear, who “hath ever but slenderly known himself” (1.1.292–3); 
this in turn makes him blind to the difference between rhetoric and intention, between 
the effusive Regan or Goneril and the reticent Cordelia. But the unknowability of the 
self can take stranger forms. Early on in Troilus, Cressida uses the construct of an 
unknowable interior as a defence against the threatening ability of a world of men to 
exhaust her, and her identity, through their desire: “Then though my heart’s content 
firm love doth bear,/ Nothing of that shall from mine eyes appear” (1.2.254–55). But 
in a painful twist, when she does perhaps, finally and desperately, want to make 
herself known in a letter to Troilus, her intentional self is rendered unknowable as the 
play stops her mouth; Troilus shreds and scatters the letter, unread, declaring, ‘Words, 
words, mere words, no matter from the heart’ (5.3.108). The inexpressible becomes 
hopelessly entangled with the unknowable in a failed act of communication. There are 
cultural contexts in which such irony has particular resonance in the period’s 
literature. Despair at the inability to make one’s heart legible becomes the tragedy of 
the actively repentant conscience in the providentialist play A Warning or Fair 
Women.23 When Anne Sanders, who stooped to folly and sought concealment of her 
guilt earlier, yearns to make her inward state visible and knowable to the world, the 
optative mode of her expression inscribes transparency as a fantasy: “…were my 
breast transparent, / That what is figured there, might be perceiv’d / Now should you 
see the very image of poore / And totter’d ruines, and a slain conscience…” 
(Warning, 2654–57). In Troilus, a play where reading – of others and of texts – is 
endless and endlessly relativised, the abortion of Cressida’s attempt to make and 
make known her own meaning has a wider philosophical dimension. Part of the play’s 
way of being true to this is to translate the author’s (real or feigned) cognitive 
aversion in Chaucer’s Troilus and Criseyde – “Men seyn, I not, that she yaf him hir 
herte” (1050) –24 to the text’s own reticence which takes over a character’s reticence, 
at once denying her agency in the lived situation and, possibly, preserving the mystery 
and indeterminacy of her selfhood at the aesthetic level. Even though Cressida cannot 
speak back and control or correct possible responses to her, Troilus’s 
epistemologically arrogant verdict mediating the unread letter to the audience is 
bound to be placed in the context of this hyper-mediated play’s by-now irreversible 
ironising of mediation. She remains the blind spot in the visual field of the dramatic 
action that the audience view; but the play itself has turned this field into a 
treacherous repository of corrective or supplementary information by this time. Blind 
spots such as these make unknowability unmissable, just as they often represent the 
limits of representation – as in scenes of sex and/or murder, whether in Othello, or in 
Macbeth. Consider the optically framed discovery scene in Heywood’s A Woman 
Killed with Kindness, where the defining sight is only evoked by its 
undemonstrability, as we see the probative husband enter his inner sanctum with a 
prayer to heaven to “keep [his] eyes,” to find his wife and her lover in bed, and 
rushing out crying, “O, O.”25 The unseen bed-chamber is foregrounded as ocular 
proof, while the “dark lantern” with which he enters is an evocative object as well as a 
trope for making invisibility glow. The defiant obscurity of the inaudible and invisible 




conspicuousness. Could we, then, talk of translucency as an emergent representational 
idiom in these knowing texts, locating opacity between construction and happening? 
 
How, then, are we to know when not to fill the gaps? What are the limits of 
translation? Performance can forestall closure, yes; but individual performative events 
– narrative or theatrical - can also push particular meanings towards preservation. 
What do the cognitive witholdings of texts and authors tell us about the event of 
knowledge, or of the motives of knowing informing the hermeneutic act?  The ending 
of Ivan Turgenev’s narrative adaptation of Shakespeare’s Lear, “King Lear of the 
Steppes,” brilliantly plays with the possibilities and mirrors our own desires back to 
us, along with our disowning of them.26 But the reader’s expectation of Turgenev’s 
narrative is also overlaid by recognition: rooted in a knowledge of the Lear story, its 
unmistakable referent; just as the Folio play of Lear itself plays with the audience’s 
knowledge of the sentimental providentialism of the old play, The True Chronicle 
History of King Leir (1594). At the end of the tender, quasi-pastoral reunion scene 
between Lear and Cordelia, Lear pleads with his daughter: “Pray you now, forget and 
forgive” (4.6.77). This is the same Lear as the one who comes out with the dead 
Cordelia’s body in his arms and declares that he has killed the slave that was “a-
hanging” her (F, 5.3.248) – a far cry from the tediously pious Leir. In Turgenev, 
Harlov – the Lear character – is on top of his own house, which he had unwisely 
given away to his daughters, destroying it brick by brick and about to collapse with it, 
when Yvlempia – a complex “Cordelia” – tries to turn the wheel: “Forgive us. 
Forgive me” (162). In a reworking of the prison scene in Lear, she tenderly urges him 
to come down and live with her “as in Christ’s own bosom” and pleads in a 
“caressing” voice, “forget the past. […] Now forgive us” (163). But inexorably, he 
topples down with the house, his heavy frame crushed by the beam of the roof. As he 
lies hallucinating, his eyes fix on Yvlempia and “he [utters], barely audibly: ‘Well, 
daughter … It’s you I won’t for…’.” His fracture is revealed by his autopsy, but the 
intended final words remains a mystery. The first-person narrator, a young boy at the 
time, is haunted by it: 
 
What did he want to say to her as he died? I asked myself the whole way back home 
on my horse: “It’s you I won’t for-get…” or “It’s you I won’t for-give…”? […] I 
decided in the end that he’d wanted to forgive.   (266–67) 
 
In this wishful rewriting, what stares back at us is the epistemological spuriousness of 
the closure we want, as well as a human need for it that is both experiential and 
aesthetic. The strand of primal vengefulness that is sporadically visible in 
Shakespeare’s Lear, forms the texture of the weave in Turgenev’s conception of 
Harlov; the familiar, canonised and more readily acknowledged dimensions of love, 
reunion and forgiveness in the father-daughter plot of King Lear are evoked to be 
relocated, with wistful gentleness, in fantasy. But while the knowledge we choose (or 
“decide” on) is fictive, the knowledge the narrative holds back, like Harlov’s feelings 
– and perhaps unlike Iago’s constructed interior – is “the signature of its plenitude.”  
Like Barthes’s “classic text,” it remains pensive: 
 
…replete with meaning…, it still seems to keep in reserve one last meaning, 
which it does not express, but whose place it keeps free and signifying. […] 




back…: like the visage, the text becomes expressive …blessed with 
interiority…27  
 
And we, on our blind-spotting tour, are left musing on the relation between the 
inexpressible and the unexpressed.  
 
 
II. Blind-spot-spotting: an adventure 
 
Blind spots in Shakespeare, as we have seen, not only straddle mimesis and poiesis, 
but bring them into dialogue. Focusing on a range of different moments, and levels, of 
apparent obscurity, this book puts methods, motives and the ends of knowing in the 
spotlight – rather than simply the condition of knowledge – and shows how this 
provocation emerges organically from the matrix of Shakespeare’s works. It is alert 
both to inscribed acts of blind-sighting within the texts, and to the text or action blind-
sighting the reader or spectator – and what insights such blindness might offer. 
Obscurity has a hallowed genealogy in literary traditions, both creative and critical. 
Narratives hold on to their secrets, luring interpreters to navigate the precarious 
waters between what Frank Kermode calls the “the latent” and “the manifest” in his 
provocative essay on hermeneutics: his “interpretation of interpretation.”28 This is a 
zone that our volume seeks to probe, even if charting it might be a contradiction in 
terms. The aim is not so much to resolve, or dissolve, the mystery – though unveiling 
may sometimes be a by-product – as to grasp the process by which literary works 
invite and induce unsuspected ways of perceiving that go beyond mere seeing. To an 
extent, this is about finding ways of accessing inaccessibility as a productive textual 
artefact that trains us to be receptive to more than the primary sense, and opens us up 
to knowledges that lurk beneath the verisimilar surface, resisting reducibility.  
 
Philip Weinstein, in Unknowing: the work of Modernist Fiction, offers a brilliant 
explication of modernism as a reaction against, and undoing of, the epistemic project 
of realism in post-Enlightenment fiction.29 Focusing on Proust, Kafka and Faulkner as 
his indicative examples, Weinstein shows these artists embracing unknowing as a 
route into a different kind of knowing from the one premised on realist narrative’s 
denials: its denial of its own emplotments, its disowning of its own manipulation of 
the unknowable, and its fabrication of the fantasy of a fit between the knowing subject 
and the knowable object, whether the latter is the self or the other or the world. 
Modernist fiction’s refusal of such fantasies, Weinstein argues, “releases narrative 
from the failed project of knowing”; its engagements must be understood not as 
knowing but as acknowledgement, eschewing epistemological control and 
commodification (5). Weinstein identifies this liberation as a response to realism 
inspired by two centuries of Enlightenment and its project of knowing, though he 
gestures back towards Bacon’s observational procedures and Descartes’s formulation 
of the knowing subject as he glances en passant at the prehistories of the 
Enlightenment narrative (3). Yet Bacon, the oft-cited progenitor of the long 
Enlightenment, understood the limits of knowing: in the context of the knowledge of 
God, or of excellence, he can only speak of “no knowledge, but wonder, which is 
nothing else but contemplation broken off, or losing itself”.30  
 
Many of the textual moves Weinstein locates in modernist prose fiction are noticeable 




brilliantly intuited, there is “a poetics of incomprehensibility” written into 
Shakespeare’s drama which we owe it to the works not to reduce “to our own brand 
of common sense.”31 Yet, in the almost three decades since then, criticism has still 
mostly focused on trying to make sense of Shakespeare and his contemporaries, rather 
than feeling its way through their non-sense. This book attempts to rectify that blind 
spot of criticism. What settled hermeneutic positions might such recalcitrance be 
reacting to? Or are such resistances more embedded in early modern approaches to 
knowledge, but elude existing paradigms? The formal translations here are distinct, 
but the probing of unknowing, intimations, obstructed knowledge, or indirection, as 
conditions of a re-oriented and re-calibrated attention, is an integral part of 
Shakespeare’s dramatic technique and his vision of how we represent and relate to the 
world around us. Theseus, the rationalist, mocks “apprehension” and champions “cool 
reason’s comprehension”. But as Hippolyta intuits, the shared perceptual errors – 
pertinently, the result of a “hateful imperfection of [the] eye” – that might seem to do 
anything but bringing clear knowledge, “grows to something of great constancy / But, 
howsoever, strange and admirable” (4.1.63; 5.1.26–7). The double adversative  – 
“but, howsoever” – captures precisely the paradox of distorted vision as a productive 
artefact. When Posthumus asks at a critical moment in the final scene of Cymbeline, 
“How come these staggers upon me?” (5.2.233) [italics mine], the sense is one of 
cognitive tottering and bewilderment, given the context of multiple revelations of 
misrecognitions – which Belarius names “error” (5.5.260) - and “recognitions” 
dizzyingly piled on one another; from this excess of “matter” (5.5.243), a distilled 
knowledge is gleaned when Posthumus and Imogen embrace in reunion and reify and 
embody the tree image encoded in the riddle on the tablet Posthumus discovered on 
his bosom on waking from his dream of Jupiter: “Hang there like fruit, my soul, / Till 
the tree die” (5.5.263–4). As the soothsayer proceeds, shortly after this moment, to 
offer his “construction” of the tablet (5.5.434–445), his explication feels redundant, 
for its truth – at least for the audience – has already been absorbed visibly into felt 
experience. Posthumus’s distinction between “collection” and “construction” at this 
point (432, 433) is significant, as they gesture towards two modes of knowing, in a 
play that keeps positing the affective language of the theatre audaciously against 
interpretation and explication, as a less definable but more vivid and capacious 
cognitive alternative. It is a mode of knowing that works through staggers, a feeling 
of déjà vu, or a sense of disorientation, through barely grasped but nonetheless felt 
traces: a dream-like haunting which is, notwithstanding, “like” “the action of [one’s] 
life” (5.4.149). In a different key, what are the implications of the games of 
knowledge that Edgar plays with his blind father, or (in a comic context) Lancelot 
Gobbo with his, and Malcolm with Macduff, setting up false trials of their own? 
These perplexities in the plot do not fit established epistemic narratives; we do not 
quite know how to make sense of them. When Polonius talked about how we, in our 
reach for wisdom, “with windlasses and assays of bias / By indirections find 
directions out”, his immediate context is strategic – imagined as “a bait of falsehood 
that takes the carp of truth” (2.1.62–3; 60). This pompous old man’s own pleonastic 
circuitousness as he expounds on the acuity of round-about routes to knowing raises a 
smile. But the image has a wider resonance for Shakespeare’s own textual strategies, 
as he characteristically subjects them to gentle mockery. A windlass is a winch – 
usually in a ship – which hauls an object or a weight up through cranking; but it is the 
context suggested by the OED which is perhaps more relevant here: its original 




circular moves, curving rather than direct, by which, in a game of bowls, the player 
brings the ball round through bias rather than trying to aim directly at the Jack.  
 
The essays in this volume are all, in one sense or another, blind-spot-spotters. They 
make us look hard at the things that go bump in the text or in systems of knowledge: 
small things that do not fit, are not what they seem, which throw us, but lead us to 
worlds elsewhere – to what Bottom calls “deep things” – if we know how to outstare 
them. Such are the seemingly nonsensical linguistic knots in Twelfth Night that Adam 
Zucker points us to: once we are jolted to look differently, they bristle with sense. 
The “baffles” of this play are apparently obstructive mechanical levers, like 
Polonius’s “assays”, making us gaze intensely where our eyes would normally glaze 
over. Like the device that acts as a “problem-solving [barrier]” in the making of 
rockets, these inscribed linguistic obscurities are shown by Adam to be an inset figure 
and analogue for the hermeneutic challenges produced by the distance of time and 
cultural context in our encounters with the play(s); they push us to forge new reading 
strategies in response to the unsettling of assumed knowledges and temporal 
alienation.  
 
Gil Harris’s essay links up with Adam’s in zooming in on things that seem foreign, 
literally and epistemologically, and then making wonder seem familiar by showing 
how they act as a contact zone between worlds divided by time and space. His focus 
is Shakespeare’s “nuts”, and his hinterland the blind spots in Shakespeare’s own 
understanding of these threshold spaces. In the process, he provocatively gestures at 
new, twenty-first-century approaches to Shakespeare, informed by critical positions 
that accommodate global and multicultural translations. Located in the “edible contact 
zone”, the nutty protagonist of Gil’s narrative identifies somatic agency as the blind 
spot of ethnography and cultural criticism.  
 
Cutting right to the heart of the physiological metaphor, Supriya Chaudhuri’s essay 
offers a perfect example of how blind spots in the text induce a diversion of normal 
routes of seeing. Through a phenomenologically layered argument, she demonstrates 
how Othello’s inferential and understood knowledge, derived through mis-seeing 
what is not there to be seen, is taken by him to be “ocular proof”. The optical process 
of supplementation from off-scene (or obscene) information is, here, shown to find a 
catastrophic analogue in a character’s incapacity to see what makes him see.32 This 
may prompt the further question of the relative agencies and motives of such 
circumstantial information-gathering, for in this analogy, the manipulative Iago is the 
operative counterpart of the brain’s act of automatic visual compensation, with no 
human choice involved. What does the crafty epistemic agent in a play do to what 
Supriya illuminates as the impotency of the audience as knowing subjects? At the 
heart of her discussion is the overvaluation of a single material sign which the play 
empties out through its own art of losing – that site of blindness where the forensic 
process is fated to flounder, but which the theatre can see and show by turning signs 
into phantasms.33 Through a glance at Jonson’s Volpone, she leaves us reflecting on 
comic undervaluation of such objects as a response to tragic over-investment.  
 
But the essays are united not only by their interest in the productive paradox of 
obfuscated or hindered knowledge. They are also engaged with the epistemic and 
hermeneutic purchase of unknowability. Aveek Sen’s essay brings together two kinds 




openness of performative embodiment. It is the former that his reading of Othello 
through the lens of Henry James sets out to minutely trace, provocatively suggesting 
that Shakespeare must have known his James.34 But in the process, it ponders the 
implications of form in speculating about Emilia as a “probable and possible woman 
incarnated in the theatre”, pointing us to the “Emilia-shaped hole” in the texture of the 
“small beer” scene. This gives us a way of seeing many similar blind spots in the 
play: for instance, in the Desdemona-shaped hole in Emilia’s Folio-unique speech on 
men at the end of the “willow scene” (4.3.86–103). Imogen Stubbs’s Desdemona 
hugged and bonded with Zoe Wanamaker’s Emilia through this speech in Trevor 
Nunn’s 1989 production; in Janet Suzman’s landmark 1987 production, Joanna 
Weinberg as Desdemona lightly, almost absently, touched Dorothy Goulde/Emilia’s 
cheek and went off alone in her own direction; other Desdemonas have filled the gap 
by widening it, inscribing a failure of solidarity and solace. Theatrical interpretation 
can play with such indeterminacies and inflect the genre of a play. But the play itself 
can play a game of knowledges against performative intent, defying it with a live, 
intractable core. Like Cressida who remains the unknown quantity in her play, the 
residue of the unknowable is shown, ironically, to preserve Emilia’s tragic potential in 
the midst of her generic degradation through handkerchiefs and whispers - not so 
much what she un-knew as what we can never know about what she “thought … 
then.” 
 
A generic theme runs through several of our essays, whether explicitly or 
subliminally, and suggests further connections. A single play – Othello – undergoes a 
journey through genres from Cinthio’s comic novella through Shakespeare’s 
wrenchingly painful play to Volpone’s comedic slamming of the drama of 
knowledge, across Supriya and Aveek’s essays; by the time it reaches Henry James in 
Aveek’s study, its genre is too post-lapsarian to fit into a known typology, whether 
narrative or dramatic. Stephen Spiess discusses Shakespearean “comic” violence as a 
site of misrecognition – both in the sense that it is a response to epistemic instability 
and insecurity, and in its propensity to beget misreadings. Reading The Comedy of 
Errors against the grain of established critical hermeneutics leads to a (mis)reading of 
such errors, which at once reveals their implicit investments and unlocks knowledges 
that they veil. Putting pressure on violence as a marker at once of obfuscation and 
authenticity across the divide between subjection and subjecthood, this essay invites 
us to revisit the generic implications of Adam’s, where linguistic “blind spots” 
produce hilarious but intimate asymmetries that test the limits of comedy. It also 
enters into implicit dialogue with Supriya’s by positing a reading strategy that turns 
the phantasmic underfreighting of frivolous violence into a legible but embodied sign. 
In showing how error and errancy come together in the play’s beatings and blows, it 
asks whether comedy itself has become a potential blind spot of criticism, generating 
a resolute, homogenising unreading that obscures the distinct ethical and emotional 
knowledges offered by the very ‘meaninglessness’ of humorous aggression in the 
plural ecologies of early modern theatres and streets.  
 
Tanya Pollard, meanwhile, highlights the generic stakes of knowledge and its gaps, 
showing how the mis-cognition and mis-re-cognition of kin and kind, gene and genre, 
in The Winter’s Tale bring the blind spots of life and literature into dialogue, and 
further face us with the implications of the blind spots of generic reception. After all, 
as Zachary Lesser points out in his response, “mongrel tragicomedy” – like 




Condell’s retinal map of Shakespeare’s plays: Shakespeare’s Comedies, Histories and 
Tragedies.35 As Tanya provocatively suggests, “bastards baffle recognition” when it 
comes to literary kind, standing in for unacknowledgable genetic mixtures – like 
Adam’s baffles, they are non-compliant elements in a generic field that induce radical 
affective cognition by obstructing received modes of knowing. The blind spotting of 
genre inevitably questions the cultural work of reception, whether in the theatre or in 
criticism and textual scholarship. It also brings up evolving questions about what the 
cognitive mechanism of data tools can tell us about generic textures, and our 
assumptions about genre, as text-analysis of Shakespeare through Docuscope at 
Carnegie Mellon has done.36 
 
Blind spots in works of art have a way of bringing into play a variety of critical 
approaches, as our essays show us: the conception of this book partly intuits that. But 
one would not necessarily have guessed what methodology may have to do with what 
we want art to do for us, and how we deal with and wield both available and 
inaccessible knowledges in our individual and communal lives; let alone when we put 
the human need to know in the hands of a machine. Michael Witmore and Jonathan 
Hope’s dialogue on machine learning and Shakespeare is a revealing point of 
departure as we test methods of interrogating literary texts, what they tell us and what 
they withhold, and what their blind spots tell us about ours. When we put our 
humanistic questions about, say, attribution, to a neural network – that is, an 
algorithm trained to home in on patterns – we are entrusting the process of 
recognition to a system which delivers accuracy but defies explanation or 
representation. Machines, after all, pick up syntagmatic structures easily, but have 
little yield on language that has paradigmatic flexibility or polysemic density. For 
Mike, the refusal of that transparency is the black box that hides the antecedents of 
the results in our encounter with its meaning-making. But in the very  
process, it becomes, for him, a mimetic mirror for a particular epistemic desire and its 
operative conditions – our desire to apprehend the invisible blind spot “where a 
literary and linguistic self hides”. But Jonathan turns this very inscrutability into an 
invitation to re-examine the blind spots that are embedded in Shakespearean (or 
poetic) language itself; for him this impasse does not invalidate but redirects the 
human reader. His provocation is to posit mechanical mistranslation as the productive 
blind spot which enables us to see deep patterns of language functioning and the 
quantitative basis of what we, as literary scholars, are trained to think of as the 
qualitative essence or distinction of an author or style: polysemy, for instance. Using 
google translate’s machine learning algorithm as an example, Jonathan argues that 
while the model itself defies direct visualisation, it almost literally diverts our eye to 
the neighbourhood of a word, selected according to its vector or string of properties: 
like the surrounding information to which the brain directs the eye to fill in the lacuna 
of the punctum caecum. This makes me recall a little experiment that Mike did for me 
with a vector space model, mapping early modern words of investigation and enquiry 
along an axis associated with gender. To my surprise, “discover” seemed to co-occur 
with words aligned with femininity. On looking harder, we saw that it was in fact the 
passive form “discovered” that was feminine, and looking in the lexical 
neighbourhood revealed that “discoveries” was in fact comfortably clustered in the 
extreme “male” corner with “discerning”, “experimental”, and “demonstration”. In 
the light of Mike’s digital experiment, then, I can understand Jonathan’s point about 
the detection of directionalities: “assays of bias” push us to the thresholds of the 






And so a dialogue becomes a conversation; one which Zack joins in, crossing over 
from a different conversation. For he asks what human mistranslations of some of the 
most oft-quoted lines from Shakespeare tell us about the blind spots of quotation itself 
as an act of cultural remembrance. Zack combines statistical analysis and human 
interpretation to put pressure on the persistent but identical misquotation of a line 
from Hamlet’s soliloquy, by editors, scholars, actors and random users of the “Yahoo 
Answers” website. His findings redirect our attention to a discernible desire for 
Shakespeare to sound “Shakespearean”: that idea of authorial distinction that Mike 
and Jonathan explore in the context of the mistranslation of machines in attribution 
studies. It is significant that Zack, like them, alights on “To be or not to be” – perhaps 
the most “Shakespearean” soliloquy in the cultural imaginary. “Conscience doth make 
cowards of us all”, through the tiny replacement of “does” with “doth”, along with the 
capitalization of “c” in “Conscience”, and the excision of “Thus” to begin with this 
word, face us with a collective, unconscious and historically ongoing but evolving 
longing for Shakespeare to be marked by elevation, archaism, formality, piety, and 
proverbial wisdom - suitable for commonplacing. A common misquotation of 
Gertrude is shown to be driven by similar investments, but mis-correction (or over-
correction) becomes in turn the further blind spot of reception and memory, whether 
in critical or editorial practice or in the history of reading or spectating – making us 
re-think the relation between error and misremembering. In the spirit of this volume, a 
personal anecdote may not be out of place. My Italian friends Nubar and Pallina were 
travelling in Scotland when they met a couple of Scotsmen with whom they got 
talking about political theory. These new acquaintances kept asking them eager 
questions about “Gromsky’s” influence on them. Initially befuddled, Nubar 
eventually saw beyond what had seemed a mere mistake. These idealistic and 
somewhat awe-struck leftist young men clearly wanted Gramsci (whom they had 
distantly heard of) to be a Trotsky (whom they “knew”); the mishearing/ 
misremembering/mistranslating came out of an inarticulate fantasy of a unified – and 
therefore easily grasped – Great Marxist Tradition, revolutionary and seamless 
through times and cultures.37 How would Stephen and Adam extend their thoughts on 
mistaking, after such knowledge?  
 
Such questions arising, and leaving a space for yet unspoken answers, brings me to 
the shape of this book.  
 
III. ‘The forms of things unknown’38 
 
Tracing the unknowable back into modes of knowing so far unexplored or merely 
intuited, then, is the main conceptual aim of this book – pitching into a critical terrain 
which has seen stirrings of interest in alternative epistemes.39 But it is not its only 
aim. We also have a methodological and pedagogic mission, which makes the volume 
structurally and intellectually innovative. While the essays are thematically 
connected, the volume is structured as an internal dialogue. Each essay is followed by 
either one substantial response from another contributor, or two shorter responses 
from two contributors. The impulse behind such a novel format is an urge to capture a 
vital part of intellectual life within present-day academia. So many conversations we 
have at seminars and conferences, or indeed more informally over coffee, simply 




such dialogical thinking and “talking”. Some of the essays in this volume come out of 
a seminar which made us feel the urgency to channel such conversations into a less 
evanescent form, without losing the openness of address and response.40 Through its 
unusual and experimental format, this book seeks to stake out a place, and a voice, for 
a particular kind of dialogic and processive intellectual energy rather than letting it 
dissipate; to encourage cross-fertilisation while thoughts are fresh and explorative; 
and to translate a sense of intellectual “community” into print. It is also designed to 
write fun and play back into scholarship. Finally, it aims to catch the alertness 
induced and kept alive by interruption and questioning; a synecdochic exercise in 
dwelling in a state of critical vulnerability, anticipation and readiness. In that spirit, it 
is structured to invite stoppages and deviations. While it is woven out of a shared 
process of thinking and cross-thinking, it is happy to be a “broken woof”.  
The only book in the field of Shakespeare studies, and to the best of my knowledge, 
early modern criticism, that has attempted to break the mould in a comparable, though 
distinct, way is Anthony Dawson and Paul Yachnin’s The Culture of Playgoing in 
Shakespeare’s England. Shaped provocatively as a ‘collaborative debate’, they 
foreground ‘creative disagreement’ as a way of reading that does justice to the 
heterogeneity of the Shakespearean theatre.41 Our book shares their anti-totalising 
impulse, and their sense of co-thinking as a dynamic process; but our conversation is 
more heteroglossic, and we allow the responses to flow naturally into various forms: 
demurrals, questioning, expansion, diversion and extraction. The result is not so much 
unification as an opening up through crossovers. The dialogic form seems not just 
pedagogically relevant but methodologically inevitable: textual blindspotting, no less 
than blind spots, operates in that Barthesian interspace where the subtle mess of life 
constantly challenges the ‘purported clarities’ of organised knowledge.42 The 
centrality of encounter in the textual experience of conspicuous obscurities could not 
but be built into the structure of a book about blind spots. The constraint of space 
means that we cannot bring the dialogue round full circle, except perhaps in one inset 
dialogue (that between Mike and Jonathan who respond to each other as their topics 
are specifically interrelated and integral to their ongoing collaborative work). But in 
juxtaposing each “speaking out” with a response (or two), we want at least to give 
form to a mode of critical activity, and to present the initiation of an ongoing to and 
fro of ideas that shapes some of our liveliest critical thoughts. In the spirit of 
unfinished exchange, we have deliberately retained a certain informality of 
presentation. The aim is not only to suggest a new, collaborative model of scholarly 
conversation and revive the lamentably lost ancient traditions of dialogic pedagogy, 
but also to encourage younger scholars (and indeed more advanced scholars at a 
formative and evolving stage of their ideas) to articulate thoughts in progress, in 
conversation with their peers, and not wait till they feel knowledge has been 
controlled and chiselled into hermetic, sealed off articles which are too distant from 
process for others to easily or actively enter. In tune with how the play-texts discussed 
“know”, the form of the volume tries to be mimetic of an apprehension that preserves 
the distinction between encounter and knowledge, acknowledgement and mastery.  
 
                                                        
I am grateful to Tania Demetriou, George Oppitz-Trotman and Richard Sherwin for their 
incisive comments on a draft of this essay. 
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